

THE ROMAN CONQUEST OF DALMATIA IN THE LIGHT OF APPIAN'S *ILLYRIKE*

MARJETA ŠAŠEL KOS

When G. De Sanctis referred to the events of 167 BC, the situation after the Third Illyrian War and the division of Illyria into three districts, he remarked that between the Arsia and Narenta Rivers there was an immense lacuna, an extensive area none of which had yet been subdued by the Romans. F. Càssola added that this was true in particular after the campaign of C. Sempronius Tuditanus in 129 BC, when the Histri definitively came under Roman control¹. No doubt the Romans were aware of it, although for a long time they never gave priority to the conquest of Illyricum. In general, they led a pragmatic policy of solving various problems as they came along, and obviously political and military situations elsewhere required a more immediate action. Thus the conquest of Illyricum was postponed, it was being conquered gradually, and Octavian's Illyrian wars were the first systematic attempt to bring the region under Roman control. Its conquest was accomplished as late as 9 AD, after Tiberius quelled the dangerous Pannonian-Dalmatian revolt, which had broken out in 6 AD. In terms of later Pannonia not much territory had been under Roman control by the time of Octavian, not even the area around the important Pannonian emporium of Siscia/Segest (ic)a. The situation in later Dalmatia was entirely different, since it was affected by the Roman expansion as early as the first Roman intervention across the Adriatic in the course of the First Illyrian War in 229 BC.

The contents and characteristics of the Illyrike

Appian's *Illyrike* contains a short account of the Roman conquests of the eastern Adriatic and western and central Balkan regions, as well as the eastern Alps. It is not an independent book, but an appendix of the 9th book dealing with the history of Macedonia (*Makedonike*). This is mentioned by Appian in the last book of his *Civil Wars*, in a passage referring to 35 BC

¹ F. CÀSSOLA, La politica romana nell'alto Adriatico, in: *Aquileia e l'alto Adriatico* (Antichità Altoadr. 2), Udine 1972, 61.

(5.145.601-602), where he complained that he could not find enough data about the history of Illyria to fill up an entire book. The fact that he referred to it in this passage contributed to its preservation, since it was placed in some manuscripts after the 5th book of the *Civil Wars*. The *Illyrike* is the only narrative from antiquity with such a title, that is, the only continuous Illyrian history that we have, and, as it seems, also the only work that had ever been written on this subject in antiquity. Although incomplete, unsystematic, and in places imprecise or even erroneous, it is nonetheless one of the most important sources for the history of the regions between the Norican kingdom and Macedonia. Most of the data concern the future provinces of Dalmatia, Pannonia, and Moesia. These regions had often been known as Illyria or (later) Illyricum; however, the name has not yet been precisely defined². One of its definitions is offered by Appian in chapter 6 of the *Illyrike*, and indeed in his time it approximately corresponded to the countries in which the Illyrian customs-duty (*publicum portorii Illyrici*) was levied. Ca. AD 10, after the division of Illyricum into *Superius* and *Inferius*, it was called *publicum portorii Illyrici utriusque*. However, in the middle of the 2nd century, under Antoninus Pius, it became united to the *portorium ripae Thraciae*; at that time *publicum portorii Illyrici* actually comprised countries ‘from the sources of the Danube to the Pontic Sea’, as expressed by Appian, and also including Dacia³. The historical events narrated by Appian, however, refer for the most part to the last two centuries BC. The origins of the Roman Illyricum go back to the period after the fall of Teuta in 228 BC, when the Romans established a kind of protectorate in one part of the territory formerly belonging to the Illyrian state, which is not exactly defined. Polybius said that ‘the Romans subdued the Ardiaei, and received several embassies offering surrender, among others those of the Parthini and Atintanes’ (2.11.10-11), adding in the next chapter that after the treaty Teuta ‘withdrew from all of Illyria except from a few places’ (2.12.3). Some territory was given to Demetrius of Pharos, but neither he nor Pinnes held authority over those regions and towns, which came under the Roman dominion by way of having been received into the so-called Roman friendship, that is, Corcyra, Apollonia, Epidamnus, the Parthini, Atintanes, and Issa, as well as

² M. ŠAŠEL KOS, *Zgodovinska podoba prostora med Akvilejo, Jadranom in Sirmijem pri Kasiju Dionu in Herodijanu / A Historical Outline of the Region between Aquileia, the Adriatic, and Sirmium in Cassius Dio and Herodian*, Ljubljana 1986, 88 ff.; EAD., s.v. Illyricum, in: *Der Neue Pauly: Enzyklopädie der Antike*, Bd. 5 (Stuttgart, Weimar 1998), 940-943.

³ F. VITTINGHOFF, s.v. Portorium, in: *RE* 22.1 (1953), 358-361. On *publicum portorii Illyrici*, see also A. DOBÓ, *Publicum portorium Illyrici* (Diss. Pann. II 16), Budapest, 1940; S.J. DE LAET, *Portorium. Étude sur l'organisation douanière chez les Romains, surtout à l'époque du Haut-Empire*, Brugge 1949, 175 ff.

Pharos⁴. Appian said that 'the Romans replied that Cercyra, Pharos, Issa, Epidamnus and the Illyrian people of the Atintani were already under the control of Rome, and that Pinnes could retain the remaining part of the kingdom of Agron and become a friend of the Roman people under the condition that he should not attempt to seize the above mentioned possessions' (7.21). This so-called protectorate should be considered the origin of a Roman concept of Illyricum (Fig. 1). After the defeat of Perseus the southern part of the Illyrian kingdom to the south of Lissus was annexed to the province of Macedonia as a part of its fourth *meris*⁵. All subsequent Roman conquests, first of all the rest of the Illyrian kingdom, and next, of the northern coastal regions and the Dalmatian hinterland, were gradually added to this original Roman Illyris/Illyria.

According to the modern division, the *Illyrike* is divided into thirty chapters, which are only loosely and more or less logically connected with each other. The structure of the narrative is uneven and disproportionate, because it depended entirely on Appian's use of different sources. His narrative is a compilation, which is based on data taken from different historical, geographical, and other works. Almost half of the *Illyrike* consists of Octavian's wars in Illyricum, for which Appian no doubt directly used Augustus' *Commentarii*⁶. Appian's account is thus of additional importance, since next to nothing is preserved of Augustus' writings in the original. In the 6th chapter Appian, in addition to his explanation of the name 'Illyrian', remarked that he could not find in his sources precise data about the causes and pretexts for the wars with various Illyrian peoples. This is *eo ipso* a proof that no consistent account of the history of Illyricum existed at his time and he had to excerpt the relevant data from various annalistic sources or histories such as Livy's, where the events were narrated under different years. Often the most important information was the name of a Roman magistrate of consular or praetorian rank, who conducted a particular campaign, with no accent on the historical context. The peoples involved had little in common but the fact that they inhabited the region known as Illyricum. It was not easy to produce a coherent history of a country, and Appian certainly was

⁴ P.S. DEROW, Pharos and Rome, *ZPE* 88, 1991, 261-270; however, see also A.M. ECKSTEIN, Pharos and the Question of Roman Treaties of Alliance in the Greek East in the Third Century B.C.E., *Class. Philology* 94, 1999, 395-418, for the negative opinion; however, Pharos is mentioned by Appian as having been under the Roman dominion, whether or not it had an official *foedus*.

⁵ N.G.L. HAMMOND, *The Macedonian State. Origins, Institutions, and History*, Oxford 1989, 380; see the map in F. PAPAZOGLU, Quelques aspects de l'histoire de la province de Macédoine, in: *ANRW* II 7.1 (1979), 302-369, opposite p. 304.

⁶ Doubt is not justified, see e.g. E. GABBA, *Appiano e la storia delle guerre civili*, Firenze 1956, 217, and most recently A.M. GOWING, *The Triumviral Narratives of Appian and Cassius Dio* (Michigan Monographs in Classical Antiquity), Ann Arbor 1992, 40-41; 321 ff.




Fig. 1 - Towns and peoples under the 'protection' of Rome after the First Illyrian War.

not able to do it well, at least not from our point of view. When adapting data for his own narrative, he neglected to reconstruct the context and did not concern himself with the details – with the exception of Octavian's Illyrian Wars.

In the 1st chapter Appian described the geographic extent of Illyria, which he understood in the broad sense of his own time, the Antonine Empire. More than half of the *Illyrike* concerns the history of later Dalmatia. In the 2nd chapter Appian narrated the genealogical story according to which Polyphaemus and Galatea had three sons, Celtus, Illyrius and Galas. Illyrius in turn had several sons, daughters, and grandchildren, of which several were the ancestors of peoples who inhabited the later Dalmatia. These were: the Encheleis, Autariatae, Taulantii, Parthini, and Daorsi. Several others that he listed were settled in other regions, while he explicitly added that there were others whom he did not mention. In the 3rd chapter Appian described the struggles between the Scordisci and Triballi, as well as between the Autariatae and Ardiaei, and mentioned the Liburni and their piracy. The narrative of the next two chapters mainly concerned the history of the Autariatae and partly that of the Scordisci. In chapters 7-9 he gave a short account of the three Illyrian wars; several important events in the course of these wars took place in the area of later Dalmatia. It is significant that in Appian's opinion the Illyrian history in the strict sense began with the Illyrian Wars, i.e. with the first phase of the Roman conquest of Illyricum. This is most interesting for his general view about the so-called Roman 'imperialism' and Roman foreign policy. In chapters 10 and 11 Appian described the Roman wars against the Ardiaei, Pleraei and Delmatae.

By the time of Caesar, the Delmatae – the most powerful Roman enemy on the eastern Adriatic coast after the fall of the Illyrian kingdom(s) – had already occupied much of the coastal area. In chapters 12-13 and 15, Caesar's activities in Illyricum are described, followed by the activities of various Caesarian generals who fought against the adherents of Pompey, as well as Vatinius' governorship in Illyria after Caesar's assassination. Most of these events took place in Dalmatia. In chapter 14 the Paeones are described, in chapter 16 all peoples and tribes are listed against whom Octavian fought in 35-33 BC. This war was described in great detail since the narrative was taken directly from Augustus' own report. Octavian made war first on the Iapodes and Pannonians (Segestani), and afterwards on the Delmatae and neighbouring peoples. The Dalmatian phase of his wars is described in chapters 25-28. In the remaining two chapters (29 and 30), which may correspond to the two introductory chapters and may be considered as a conclusion, the Raeti, Norici, and Moesi are briefly described.

The validity of the data for the history of Illyricum

In the course of the last century and a half, the value of Appian's *Roman History* has been variously assessed, oscillating from very negative to quite positive, depending on the changed methods of the *Quellenforschung* and the advanced sociological, economic, and anthropological studies⁷. Appian's work has been analyzed under different angles, the starting point being in particular a more objective approach to the author: what were his intentions and scopes, what did he want to achieve with his *History*? Assessment of the *Illyrike* depended to some extent on the general assessment of Appian's work. It may be claimed that the value of the Illyrian narrative for the history of the Balkans in antiquity on the whole is not considerable, because it offers us so few data from the complex history of the Illyrian regions during the Republican age. If the chapters on Octavian's wars are not counted, it may well be claimed that the data Appian chose for the rest of the *Illyrike* were arbitrarily selected by the author. He could not produce an exhaustive and logically structured compilation, because, as he mentioned, he could not find adequate sources; possibly a systematic history of the Balkans was not at all his objective. But no doubt he felt that much was lacking in his account, and had to admit several times in the course of the *Illyrike* that he could not find enough information, not even for certain events which he mentioned. Thus his work preserves much precious but often disconnected information, and in general cannot be considered satisfactory for a modern historian. Certain important peoples were not even mentioned in the *Illyrike*, or were merely referred to, such as the Liburni, Taurisci, Breuci, Daesitiates, Pirustae, and others settled in what is present-day Bosnia and Herzegovina, while on the other hand, mention is made of some of the most obscure peoples, defeated in the course of Octavian's campaigns, for which no evidence – or almost none – has been preserved elsewhere.

The history of Illyricum was the sum of histories of each of the several so-called Illyrian peoples and tribes who were settled in geographically diversified regions. Their natural resources varied greatly; these, as well as a greater or lesser distance from centres of higher civilization in the towns of

⁷ For a negative assessment: E. SCHWARTZ, *s.v.* Appianus (2), in: *RE* 2.1 (1896), 216-237 (= ID., *Griechische Geschichtsschreiber*, Leipzig 1957, 361-393); a more moderate: GABBA, *Appiano* (n. 6); a more positive: B. GOLDMANN, *Einheitlichkeit und Eigenständigkeit der Historia Romana des Appian* (Beiträge zur Altertumswiss. 6), Hildesheim, Zürich, New York 1988; GOWING, *Triumviral Narratives* (n. 6); É. FAMERIE, *Le latin et le grec d'Appien. Contribution à l'étude du lexique d'un historien grec de Rome* (Éc. Pratique d. Hautes Études III, Hautes ét. du monde gréco-romain 24), Genève 1998.

the littoral, conditioned the economy, the way of life and the degree of acculturation of different 'Illyrian' peoples⁸. Illyria first came into contact with Greek civilization through colonisation and merchants; however, by the time of the rise of Agron's Illyrian kingdom, there were already many Roman and Italian merchants active in the Adriatic. The First Illyrian War was the first occasion when the Roman army embarked on the shores of the eastern Adriatic, and it opened the way for the Romans to conquer Macedonia, Greece, Asia Minor, and the Balkans; the conquest of Illyria seems to have been of the least importance. However, in the second half of the 2nd century BC the Romans began to conquer both the central Balkans and the regions to the east of Cisalpine Gaul, in the direction of Segest(ic)a/Siscia⁹. Their expeditions started on the one hand from the north, from Aquileia, and on the other from the south, from one of the southern Illyrian or Dalmatian ports, while military campaigns were also conducted from Macedonia against the Dardani and against the tribes who lived in the rest of the territory of the future province of Moesia. The achievements were often only temporary and as late as Caesar's proconsulship of Cisalpine Gaul the Roman sway did not extend beyond the region of Emona¹⁰, which may have been attached to Cisalpina (and later to Italy)¹¹. Extensive conquests in Dalmatia and Pannonia were carried out by Octavian in 35-33 BC, and completed later in his reign by Tiberius¹². If not earlier, the geo-strategic importance of Illyricum became clear at least at the time of Caesar, when Pompey's adherents wanted to consolidate their position in the province with the support of the Delmatae, not only to gain a direct access to Italy via Histria and Cisalpina, but also to prevent a possible passage of Caesarian

⁸ J. ŠAŠEL, Factors of Economic and Social Development in the Western Balkan Region: the Transition from Prehistory to the Roman Period, in: ID., *Opera selecta* (Situla 30), Ljubljana 1992, 507-513.

⁹ J. ŠAŠEL, Lineamenti dell'espansione romana nelle Alpi Orientali e nei Balcani occidentali, in: *Aquileia e l'arco alpino orientale* (Antichità Altoadr. 9), Udine 1976, 71-90 (= *Opera selecta*, 1992, 408-431); F. PAPAZOGLU, *The Central Balkan Tribes in Pre-Roman Times. Triballi, Autariatae, Dardanians, Scordisci and Moesians*, Amsterdam 1978.

¹⁰ J. ŠAŠEL, Zur Frühgeschichte der XV. Legion und zur Nordostgrenze der Cisalpina zur Zeit Caesars, in: *Römische Geschichte, Altertumskunde und Epigraphik. Festschrift für Artur Betz zur Vollendung seines 80. Lebensjahres* (Archäologisch-epigraphische Studien 1), Wien 1985, 547-555 (= *Opera selecta*, Ljubljana 1992, 469-477); M. ŠAŠEL KOS, Caesar, Illyricum, and the Hinterland of Aquileia, in: *L'ultimo Cesare. Scritti, Riforme, Progetti, Poteri, Congiure*, ed. G. URSO (Monografie / Centro ricerche e documentazione sull'ant. class. 20), Roma 2000, 294-297.

¹¹ J. ŠAŠEL, Zur verwaltungstechnischen Zugehörigkeit Emonas, *Acta Arch. Acad. Sc. Hung.* 41, 1989, 169-174 (= *Opera selecta*, Ljubljana 1992, 707-714); M. ŠAŠEL KOS, Emona was in Italy, not in Pannonia, in: *Autonomous Towns in Noricum and Pannonia. Pannonia I* (Situla 41), Ljubljana 2003, 11-19.

¹² ŠAŠEL KOS, *Outline* (n. 2), 154 ff.

troops across the Adriatic from Italy to Macedonia. Any large-scale insurrection in these regions so close to Italy could have been most dangerous for the safety of Italy; such was, towards the end of Augustus' reign, the Dalmatian-Pannonian rebellion in AD 6-9, called by Suetonius *gravissimum omnium externorum bellorum post Punica* (Tib. 16).

The three Illyrian wars

At the end of chapter 5 Appian claimed that what he wrote in the preceding five chapters was an introduction to his *Illyrian History*. Clearly, his scope was to describe the conquest of Illyricum, which began with the Illyrian wars. The Ardiaean dynasty originated from the area of the later Dalmatia and their dynasts imposed themselves as the Illyrian kings. The Ardiaei were one of the most powerful so-called Illyrian people¹³, originally probably settled in the interior, as is clear from the sources of the 4th century BC, but they were known as pirates already in the 3rd century BC. According to Strabo, they were settled along the river Naro/Narenta opposite the island of Pharos (Hvar), in the neighbourhood of the Daorsi and Pleraei (7.5.5 c. 315; see also Ptol. 2.16.8); however, Strabo's data have been disputed by F. Papazoglu who located the Ardiaei in the southern Illyrian area (Montenegro). In the hinterland (the upper Naro?, the area of Labeatis Lacus?) they bordered on the Autariatae (Appian, *Illyr.* 3), with whom they were in dispute over salt-springs (Strabo 7.5.11 c. 317); Appian added that the Autariatae were the most important inland Illyrian people, while the Ardiaei were powerful on sea¹⁴. It is now no longer considered that Polybius would have been the best source for the first two Illyrian wars and Livy for the third one; it has become a general opinion that the narratives of Appian and Cassius Dio offer complementary data for a more precise reconstruction of the course of events¹⁵.

¹³ In Dio's manuscripts, as well as in some manuscripts of Strabo they are called Sardiaei; however, the Ardiaei and Sardiaei should not be considered two different peoples, as in D. VOLLMER, *Symploke. Das Übergreifen der römischen Expansion auf den griechischen Osten* (Hermes Einzelschriften 54), Stuttgart 1990, 38-39, since they are never mentioned as two different peoples elsewhere.

¹⁴ B. ČOVIĆ, O izvorima za istoriju Autarijata (Über Quellen zur Geschichte der Autariaten), *Godišnjak* 5 (Centar za balkanološka ispitivanja) 3, 1967, 103-122; J. LUČIĆ, O migracijama ilirskog plemena Ardijejaca (Sur les migrations des Ardiéens, peuple illyrien), *Živa Antika* 16, 1966, 245-254; F. PAPA-ZOGLU, O teritoriji ilirskog plemena Ardieja (Sur le territoire des Ardiéens), *Zbornik Filozofskog fakulteta Beograd* 7/1, 1963, 71-86; W. PAJAŃKOWSKI, Die Ardiäer – Ihre Wohnsitze und ihre historische Rolle, *Godišnjak* 14, Centar za balkanološka ispitivanja 12, 1975, 109-121.

¹⁵ P. CABANES, *Les Illyriens de Bardylis à Gentios (IV^e-II^e siècles avant J.-C.)* (Regards sur l'histoire), Paris 1988, 268-322; R.M. ERRINGTON, Rome and Greece to 205 B.C., in: *The Cambridge Ancient*

Appian is the only one to mention that Agron re-conquered certain regions, which had once belonged to the Illyrian kingdom but were conquered by Pyrrhus (7.17). After the death of his father, Pyrrhus was reared at the court of the Illyrian king Glaucias and his Epirote wife Beroea and was at a later date married, in one of his several political marriages, to the Illyrian princess, Bardylis' daughter Bircenna. It is not mentioned in the sources who was to succeed Glaucias in the coastal part of Illyria; it may be hypothesized that Pyrrhus, as his adopted son, could have even been legally justified in claiming a part of the kingdom for himself. However, it is certain that by way of his marriage to Bircenna he maintained a certain influence at the court of the most powerful Illyrian kingdom during that period. Pyrrhus' later contacts with the Illyrians were hostile; around 280 BC, he held Apollonia, and Justin mentions his military campaigns against the Illyrians. Perhaps he occupied the former Taulantian kingdom. The Illyrian king Monunius (attested ca. 280 BC), who struck his coins in Epidamnus, may have theoretically been Glaucias' son. According to Cassius Dio, the authority of Pyrrhus was acknowledged by the Aetolians, the Macedonian king Philip and by the dynasts in Illyricum, clearly indicating that no strong hegemony existed at that period in Illyria, at least not in its south-western part (40.3, Boiss. I, 117)¹⁶. The regions formerly in possession of Pyrrhus and his descendants must have comprised at least the territories of the Parthini and Atintani, and this may have been the reason why they were the first to try to get rid of the Illyrian authority and seek Roman protection, along with several Greek towns, after the First Illyrian War (*Fig. 1*). However, it is not possible to define other Illyrian territories that had been occupied by Pyrrhus.

The next issue, which is instructively supplemented by Appian's account, is that of the causes for the war. Polybius said that Roman and Italian merchant vessels sailing in the Adriatic were imperilled by the Illyrian pirates,

*History*², vol. VIII. *Rome and the Mediterranean to 133 B.C.*, eds. A.E. ASTIN et al., Cambridge 1989, 81-106; W. PAJĄKOWSKI, *Die Illyrier - Illyrii proprie dicti. Geschichte und Siedlungsgebiete. Versuch einer Rekonstruktion* (ed. L. MROZEWICZ), Poznań 2000, 209-257, with citations of earlier bibliography. See, for a short account of the wars, e.g. ŠAŠEL KOS, *Outline* (n. 2), 64-74; E. GABBA, La prima guerra punica e gli inizi dell'espansione transmarina, in: *Storia di Roma II: L'impero mediterraneo I: La repubblica imperiale*, ed. A. SCHIAVONE, Torino 1990, 66-67; P. CABANES, L'Adriatique dans l'antiquité, in: P. CABANES et al., *Histoire de l'Adriatique*, Paris, 2001, 73-75; H. HEFTNER, *Der Aufstieg Roms. Vom Pyrrhoskrieg bis zum Fall von Karthago (280-146 v. Chr.)*, Regensburg 1997, 184-187; P. DEROW, The Arrival of Rome: from the Illyrian Wars to the Fall of Macedon, in: A. ERSKINE, (ed.), *A Companion to the Hellenistic World*, Malden, Oxford, Melbourne, Berlin 2003, 51-70.

¹⁶ M. ŠAŠEL KOS, Pyrrhus and Illyrian kingdom(s?), in: *Grčki utjecaj na istočnoj obali Jadrana / Greek Influence Along the East Adriatic Coast* (Proceedings of the Intern. Conference held in Split from Sept. 24th to 26th 1998), eds. N. CAMBI, S. ČAČE, B. KIRIGIN, Split 2002, 101-120.

and many Italian traders had even been killed by them. According to Appian, Roman protection was sought by Issa, and the embassy, sent by the Romans to investigate the matter, also included an Issaeian embassy. The Issaeian envoy Cleemporus and the Roman Coruncanus were killed by the Illyrians; P.S. Derow analysed these data and proved the historicity of the role of Issa and consequently the correctness of Appian's account¹⁷. Interestingly, Dio cited both causes as the reasons for the war, noting that Issa had an alliance (*foedus*) with the Romans (12, frg. 49). Minor differences in Appian's narrative include the date of Agron's death, Appian's different treatment of Teuta, which is much more detached and seems more objective, and the extent of Demetrius' dominions given to him by the Romans after the war.

Appian's account of the Second Illyrian War in chapter 8 also contained some data, which are elsewhere unattested, and which should be considered complementary, or corrective, in regard to Polybius' narrative. Appian mentioned neither Scerdilaidas nor Pleuratus in his *Illyrian History*. Scerdilaidas was the grandfather of Genthius and was almost certainly not a relative of Agron, as has been generally believed. This may be confirmed by the data in Appian who introduced Genthius by saying that he reigned over certain other Illyrian people, i.e. other than Agron's (9.25). That they were indeed not the Ardiaei, is confirmed by Livy, who said that Genthius was the king of the Labeates (43.19.3: ... *in Labeates, ubi Genthius regnabat*)¹⁸. It is quite typical of Appian that he omitted to mention most of the individuals who were not protagonists of the relevant events. Perhaps he wished to preserve a certain equilibrium in the first part of his narrative, for which, according to his own words, he often could not find enough data. On the other hand, he mentioned several times Pinnes, as the Illyrian king; as long as Pinnes was alive, he seems to have been the most important Illyrian king. Scerdilaidas won the main position within the Illyrian kingdom only after his death. Appian said that after Demetrius' defeat Pinnes *again* interceded on behalf of his kingdom; obviously his policy vis-à-vis the Romans was cooperative. It is generally believed that he died ca. 217 BC, since he is no longer mentioned in the sources¹⁹. He is last mentioned by Livy in connection with

¹⁷ P.S. DEROW, Kleemporos, *Phoenix* 27, 1973, 118-134; for a contrary view, in addition to those cited in notes 8 and 9, see: J.-L. FERRARY, Rome, les Balkans, la Grèce et l'Orient au II^e siècle av. J.-C., in: *Rome et la conquête du monde méditerranéen, 264-27 avant J.-C.* Tome 2: *Genèse d'un empire*, ed. C. NICOLET, Paris 1991³, 732. The reliability of Appian's source is also acknowledged by ERRINGTON, *Rome* (n. 15), 86-88.

¹⁸ M. ŠAŠEL KOS, From Agron to Genthius: Large Scale Piracy in the Adriatic, in: *I Greci in Adriatico*, 1, eds. L. BRACCESI, M. LUNI (Hesperia 15), Roma 2002, 146. See also VOLLMER, *Symploke* (n. 13), 45-47.

¹⁹ See most recently P.S. DEROW, *s.v.* Scerdilaidas, in: *The Oxford Classical Dictionary*, Oxford,

a Roman embassy to the king, to collect tribute he had not paid, or demand hostages, if he asked for a delay (22.33.5: *ad Pinnem quoque regem in Illyrios legati missi ad stipendium, cuius dies exierat, poscendum aut, si diem proferrī vellet, obsides accipiendos*).

According to Appian, Demetrius would have detached the Atintani from the Romans. Appian is also the only historian who mentioned an alliance between Demetrius and the Histri, in order to carry out piratical attacks in the Adriatic against the Greek, Roman and Italian ships. This information is important to correctly assess the impact of eastern Adriatic alliances and estimate the Roman conquest in this light. Eutropius referred to piracy as having been the cause for war of the Romans against the Histri, who raided the Roman ships transporting corn (3.7: *quia latrocinati navibus Romanorum fuerant, quae frumenta exhibebant*). The Histri may have obstructed the corn supply of the Romans who fought against the Celts in northern Italy; Diodorus mentioned that Hieron of Syracuse sent ships with corn to the Romans (25.14.1). Perhaps the Histri attacked ships, exporting grain from the Po valley to Greece²⁰. In any case they, in agreement with Demetrius of Pharos, caused great damage to various ships, but in particular to the Roman; the Romans defeated first the Histri in 221 BC, and two years later Demetrius in the Second Illyrian War. Because of the interval of two years F. Càssola hypothesized that Demetrius only joined the Histri after the First Histrian War in 221-220. This would mean that the real instigators of these attacks would have been the Histri, while Demetrius merely participated in them later, for which he soon received the deserved punishment. Also, the later period would better correspond to the date of the battle of Sellasia in 222, in which Demetrius fought as an ally of Antigonos Doson²¹. However, no argument is decisive, and perhaps Appian's version should better be retained, in particular, since he is the only source for these events.

In the 9th chapter Appian described the Third Illyrian War, but none of

New York 1996, 1363; cf. K. FIEHN, *s.v.* Skerdilaidas, in: *RE Suppl.* 5 (1931), 978-979, and T. LENSCHAU, *s.v.* Pinnas (1), in: *RE* 20.2 (1950), 1711-1712.

²⁰ G. MARASCO, Interessi commerciali e fattori politici nella condotta romana in Illiria (230-219 a.C.), *Studi Classici e Orientali* 36, 1986, 96-97; cf. G. BANDELLI, Roma e l'Adriatico fra III e II secolo a.C., in: *Strutture portuali e rotte marittime nell'Adriatico di età romana*, ed. C. ZACCARIA (Antichità Altoadr. 46; Coll. Éc. fr. Rome 280), Trieste, Roma 2001, 28, who considers both possibilities as valid.

²¹ CÀSSOLA, *Politica* (n. 1), 53 f. See for the Histrian War in general, H.J. DELL, Demetrius of Pharos and the Istrian War, *Historia* 19, 1970, 30-38; G. BANDELLI, La guerra istrice del 221 a.C. e la spedizione alpina del 220 a.C., *Athenaeum* 59, 1981, 3-28; on Demetrius particularly 8-10, with a remark that the sequence of the events is still disputable; ID., *Roma* (n. 20), 27 ff.; See particularly S. ČAČE, Rimski pohod 221. godine i pitanje političkog uređenja Histrije (Roman Campaign in the Year of 221 and the Question of the Political Organization of Histria), *Radovi Filozofskog fakulteta Zadar* 28 (15), 1988-1989, 5-17; cf. also M. ZANINOVIĆ, Histri i Liburni prema rimskoj ekspanziji (The Histri and Liburni in relation to Roman Expansion), *Diadora* 12, 1990, 50 ff.

the differences in his narrative as compared to that of Livy, which is the most important source for it, would contribute to a different explanation of Genthius' defeat. This war meant the end of the Illyrian kingdom. However, at the end of his narrative Appian committed an obvious error. He claimed that seventy towns within the kingdom of Genthius were plundered in one day by L. Aemilius Paullus after he had defeated Perseus, who allegedly acted upon secret instructions of the Senate. At a given hour the inhabitants of all the towns were ordered to bring to the main square their silver and gold, which was confiscated, upon which all the towns were plundered by the Roman army. It is clear from Polybius' report (his data are preserved in Strabo 7.7.3 c. 322 = Polyb. 30.15), and from Livy (45.34) that these were seventy Epirote towns, mainly Molossian²². The devastation of Illyria also took place, but on a much smaller scale; it was also ordered by Aemilius Paullus, and this may have been the reason that Appian mixed up the two campaigns taking place almost at the same time. Both were declared punitive expeditions but were organized to enrich the army.

The conquest of Dalmatia in the period between the fall of Genthius and Caesar

G. Bandelli listed all military campaigns taking place in Illyricum in the period between the fall of Genthius and Caesar²³. These were two campaigns against the Delmatae (156-155); one against the Scordisci (141), reconstructed on the basis of the Oxyrhynchus papyrus containing summaries of some ten of Livy's books; one against the Ardiaei and Pleraei (135); that of C. Sempronius Tuditanus and his legates against the Carni (?), Taurisci, Iapodes, Histri, and Liburni (129); an expedition against the Segestani (119), and one against the Delmati (119). After a long interval, in which no military actions are known in Illyricum, there are the data concerning L. Cornelius Cinna and Cn. Papirius who wanted to set up a base in Liburnia against Sulla (84), and as last the war of C. Cosconius against the Delmatae (78-76). Those that concern Dalmatia have all been commented by J.J. Wilkes in his *Dalmatia*. It is interesting that Appian left out a surprisingly small number of campaigns in Illyricum attested to date. This is particularly noteworthy in view of the usual criticism of the *Illyrike* for its incomplete-

²² N.G.L. HAMMOND, *Epirus. The Geography, the Ancient Remains, the History and the Topography of Epirus and Adjacent Areas*, Oxford 1967, 634-635; P. CABANES, *L'Épire de la mort de Pyrrhos à la conquête romaine (272-167 av. J.C.)*, Paris 1976, 303.

²³ G. BANDELLI, La politica romana nell'Adriatico orientale in età repubblicana, *Atti e Mem. Soc. Istriana* 83, 1983, 172-173.

ness and general deficiency. Appian did not mention the continuation of the first war against the Delmatae in 155, conducted by the consul P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica. That against the Scordisci should not be counted, because Appian only mentioned them in the introduction, referring to several Roman wars against them (chapter 3). The only other that found no mention in Appian is Cosconius' war.

Wars against the Delmatae

Dalmatia in the sense of the future province, as it was formed in the Augustan period, had not existed in the 2nd century BC and not even at the time of Caesar. Dalmatia was the name of the regions inhabited or conquered by the Delmatae. In one of his letters to Cicero from Narona in 45 BC, Vatinius mentioned that he heard that Cicero's slave, the librarian, was in the territory of the Vardaei. Vatinius promised to catch him, unless the servant took refuge in Dalmatia, but even so he had hopes of finding him (Cic., *ad fam.* 5.9: *Dicitur mihi tuus servus anagnostes fugitivus cum Vardaeis esse. de quo tu mihi nihil mandasti, ego tamen terra marique ut conquireretur praemandavi et profecto tibi illum reperiam, nisi si in Dalmatiam aufugerit, et inde tamen aliquando eruam*). Vatinius' reference to Dalmatia, which is perfectly clear in this context and undoubtedly referred to the territory of the Delmatae at the time of their expansion towards the coast, was understood by F. Papazoglu as referring to the future province²⁴. Although it was correctly interpreted by her as a country different from that of the Ardiaei, it was erroneously equated with the future Dalmatia. This was one of her arguments for not locating the Ardiaei in the coastal regions opposite the island of Pharos, as did Strabo (7.5.5 c. 315), although it is clear from other passages in Strabo, as well as from other sources, that they were also settled in present-day Montenegro and even more to the south.

The Delmatae were a powerful and warlike people, settled in central Dalmatia, with strong tendencies to expand in the direction of the coast (*Fig. 2*). They were unknown to the Greek writers of the early Hellenistic period, and are first mentioned by Polybius. According to his short account they had to acknowledge the authority of the Illyrian kingdom under Pleuratus, the father of Genthius²⁵. After Pleuratus' death they revolted and detached

²⁴ PAPAZOGLU, *Ardiëens* (n. 14), 77 n. 29.

²⁵ For a short history of the Delmatae, see C. PATSCH, *s.v.* Delmatae, in: *RE* 4.2 (1901), 2448-2455; for a detailed history, M. ZANINOVIĆ, Ilirsko pleme Delmati (The Illyrian Tribe of the Delmatae), *Godišnjak* 4 (*Centar za balkanološka ispitivanja* 2), Sarajevo 1966, 27-92; ID., Ilirsko pleme Delmati II (The Illyrian Tribe of the Delmatae II), *Godišnjak* 5 (*Centar za balkanološka ispitivanja* 3), 1967, 5-101.



Fig. 2 - The territories of the Delmatae and their neighbours.

themselves from Genthius' kingdom. As early as ten years after the fall of Genthius, Issa and the Daorsi, who both had an agreement of *amicitia* with the Romans, complained in the Senate about the attacks of the Delmatae. In Polybius' words, *'the Senate sent a commission under C. Fannius (in 158-157 BC) to inquire into the state of Illyria and in particular into the conduct of the Delmatae. This happened because Issa often sent embassies to complain about their continuous attacks on their territory and the cities in league with it, Epetium and Tragurium. Similar accusations were brought by the Daorsi. As long as Pleuratus lived, the Delmatae submitted to him, but when he died and Genthius succeeded to the throne, they revolted from him making war on the tribes on their borders. They subdued the neighbouring peoples, some of whom even paid them tribute in the shape of cattle and corn'* (32.9).

C. Marcius Figulus

Appian mentioned only the unsuccessful embassy, not the name of its leader; the Romans decided upon the war and, as Polybius noted, this decision was influenced by the fact that twelve years had passed since the war with Perseus, and senators were concerned about the lack of military exer-

cise of the Roman youth (32.13). The best description of the first phase of the war against the Delmatae, conducted in 156 BC by the consul C. Marcius Figulus²⁶, is Appian's account in his 11th chapter. The initial part of his campaign ended unsuccessfully for Figulus, whose camp was raided by the Delmatae; several Roman soldiers must have been killed in the conflict, while their commander fled with the rest of the army, having been pursued by the enemy as far as the river Naro/Narenta. Figulus' base was very likely situated in Narona, an important, originally Greek, emporium within the territory of the friendly Daorsi and the hinterland of the Ardiaei who had been subdued in the course of the Illyrian wars²⁷. As all the generals before him, he brought his army to Dalmatia across the Adriatic.

The area of Bigeste, the region of Humac near Ljubuški not far from Narona, was geo-strategically most important, and as early as the first half of the 1st century AD a Roman auxiliary station is documented there. The Bigeste area seems to have been in military use at least since Vatinius (45-44 BC), and it is not to be excluded that also the main camp of Figulus may have been constructed there²⁸. D. Periša recently researched the area topographically; in his opinion the location of Delminium/Delmium, the capital of the Delmatae, which Figulus attacked in the next phase of his campaign, is now no longer problematic²⁹. The Romans reached the Duvanjsko polje almost certainly across Čapljina and along the valleys of the Trebižat and Tihaljina Rivers, across Ljubuški and the Imotsko polje. Appian reported that Figulus wanted to attack them for the second time because of the approaching winter. With news of his attack the enemies had again assembled in the well-fortified Delminium. *'As he could not take the fortified town by storm, and because of its high position he could not use the siege equipment he had with him, he attacked and conquered the other towns, which had been partially deserted on account of the concentration of forces in Delminium. Figulus then had two-cubit long staffs covered with flax and smeared with pitch and sulphur, which were shot by catapults into Delminium. They caught fire because of friction and flew through the air like torches, causing fires wherever they fell, until most of the town had burnt. Such was the end of the war*

²⁶ T.R.S. BROUGHTON, *The Magistrates of the Roman Republic*. I, New York 1951, 447.

²⁷ ZANINović, *Delmati I* (n. 25), 28; 38.

²⁸ Plausibly suggested by D. PERIŠA, *Delmion*. Delmatski gradinski kompleks na Libu kod Duvna (A Delmataean hillfort at Lib near Duvno), *Arheološki vestnik* 56, 2005, forthcoming. On Bigeste see, in addition to *ILJug* 113-114; 670; 1913-1918, in particular E. MARIN-M. MAYER-G. PACI-I. RODÀ, Elementos para una puesta al día de las inscripciones del campo militar de Bigeste, in: *Les légions de Rome sous le Haut-Empire, Actes du Congrès de Lyon, 17-19 sept. 1998*, eds. Y. LE BOHEC, C. WOLFF (Collection du Centre d'Études Romaines et Gallo-Romaines 20), Lyon 2000, 499-514.

²⁹ PERIŠA, *Delmion* (n. 28).

fought at that time by Figulus against the Dalmatae.' This is, apart from Appian's account of Octavian's wars, one of the most detailed and vivid descriptions in the *Illyrike*. In view of his topographical results, Periša plausibly rejected other hypotheses concerning the location of the Delmataean Delmium/Delminium³⁰, locating it without any doubt to Gradina at Lib above Borčani near Duvno (present-day Tomislavgrad). At this locality great quantities of Roman Republican weapons, mainly weapons for fighting at a distance, such as *pila*, javelins, catapult bolts and arrowheads, have been discovered. Such weapons often cannot be dated precisely, but their date may have been as early as the 2nd century BC³¹. It may be added that the hillfort at Lib was identified as the Delmataean Delminium a hundred years ago by C. Patsch, who also explored the area very attentively³².

Livy described the same events in his 47th book, of which only a summary is preserved and thus his account is summarized in two sentences. However, he did mention that the war was successfully ended by the consul of the next year, P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica, who is not mentioned by Appian (*Per. 47: C. Marcius cos. adversus Dalmatas primum parum prospere, postea feliciter pugnavit. cum quibus bello confligendi causa fuit, quod Illyrios, socios populi R., vastaverant; eandemque gentem Cornelius Nasica cos. domuit; cf. Flor. 2.25*). Figulus' stratagem was probably erroneously ascribed to Nasica by Frontinus, who also mentioned his campaign (*Strat. 3.6.2*).

L. Caecilius Metellus Delmaticus

At the end of the same chapter 11, Appian preserved an unusual observation concerning the campaign against the Delmatae conducted by L. Caecilius Metellus in 119-118. In Appian's words '*Caecilius Metellus, when he was consul, decided to attack them as he wanted a triumph, although they had not caused any offence. They received him as a friend and he spent the winter with them in the town of Salona, and on return to Rome he celebrated a triumph*' (11.33). According G. Zippel and C. Patsch, Appian's account would have been exaggerated; both scholars wrongly believed that Caecilius Metellus, who wintered in Salonae, and Metellus, who fought together with L. Cotta against the Segestani (*Illyr. 10.30*), were one and the same person: the

³⁰ A. ŠKEGRO, Dalmion/Delmion i Delminium – kontroverze i činjenice (Dalmion/Delmion and Delminium: Controversy and Facts), *Opuscula archaeologica* 23-24, 1999-2000, 395-403.

³¹ PERIŠA, *Delmion* (n. 28).

³² K. PATSCH, Prilog topografiji i povjesti Županjska-Delminiuma, *Glasnik Zemaljskog muzeja Sarajeva* 16, 1904, 307-365; ID., Archäologisch-epigraphische Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der römischen Provinz Dalmatien (Sechster Teil), *Wiss. Mittb. Bos. Herz.* 9, 1904, 171-174.

consul of 119, L. Caecilius Metellus, surnamed Delmaticus after the war against the Delmatae. It has been generally believed that he first conquered Siscia together with L. Aurelius Cotta, continuing his way through the lands of the western Iapodes against the Delmatae. After spending the winter in Saloniae, he celebrated the triumph *de Delmateis* (Eutrop. 4.23; *CIL* I² p. 177; cf. Livy, *Per.* 62)³³. M.G. Morgan questioned this reconstruction of events, coming to the conclusion that the two Caecilii Metelli could not have been one and the same man. The Pannonian and the Delmataean wars were two separate military campaigns that could by no means have been mutually related, because no roads or tracks existed in the interior between the Dalmatian coast and the Pannonians that would have allowed for any major movements of the Roman army. He emphasized that Appian's account should be considered as more or less correct, depending on the degree of hostility of his source to the Caecilii Metelli³⁴. Despite some distortion of the facts, the course of events may be considered as being well reflected in Appian's account. The bias may not have been invented out of nothing, and possibly Metellus' achievements in the course of his campaign against the Delmatae were not worthy of a triumph. His wintering at Saloniae may be explained by the fact that in addition to a Greek settlement and a small, but ever growing community of Roman merchants, this may have most of all been an important harbour and town of the Delmatae³⁵, who were civilized and probably opposed to the usual policy of aggression and expansion towards the coast of the Delmatae living inland.

Perhaps the Salonitans, including the local Delmatae, indeed welcomed Metellus as a Roman general who would have protected them against the attacks from the inland Dalmatia, i.e. Dalmatia in the sense of the country of the Delmatae. It is difficult to explain correctly his campaign, as there are several possibilities of assessment. Metellus may have indeed been received as a friend at Saloniae, which would justify Appian's biased account. On the

³³ G. ZIPPEL, *Die römische Herrschaft in Illyrien bis auf Augustus*, Leipzig 1877, 137-138; PATSCH, *Delmatae* (n. 25), 2449; J. DOBIÁŠ, *Studie k Appianově knize illyrské (Études sur le livre illyrien d'Appien)*, Pragae 1930, 280-281; J.J. WILKES, *Dalmatia*, London 1969, 33-34.

³⁴ G.M. MORGAN, "Lucius Cotta and Metellus". Roman Campaigns in Illyria during the Late Second Century, *Athenaeum* n.s. 49, 1971, 271-301, particularly 289 ff.

³⁵ On Saloniae see E. MARIN, Grad Saloniae / Salona (The City of Saloniae / Salona), in: *Longae Saloniae* (Niz Salona 11), ed. E. MARIN, I-II, Split 2002, 11-12; 21, who pointed out that the earliest archaeological remains in the town are very scarce. D. RENDIĆ-MIOČEVIĆ, Antički Grci na našem Jadranu i neka pitanja naseljavanja priobalja Manijskog zaljeva (Ancient Greeks on the Eastern Adriatic and Some Questions Concerning Settling of the Coast Line of Manios Bay), *Adrias* 2, Split 1988, 9, believed that Saloniae was not an original Issaeon sub-colony, but a Delmataean settlement; his opinion is contrary to that of G. NOVAK, Isejska i rimska Salona [Issaeon and Roman Salona], *Rad Jugoslavenske akademije znanosti i umjetnosti* 270, 1949, 67-92.

other hand, however, he may have fought with much success against the Delmatae of the hinterland, as was supposed by G. Zippel on the basis of his cognomen Delmaticus, and a large booty, out of which he could rebuild the sanctuary of Castor in Rome (Cic., *Verr.* 2.154; *pro Scauro* 46). In his opinion it was at that time that Illyria had been organized as an administratively independent province³⁶. This date, however, is far too early, the province was most probably created as late as Octavian/Augustus³⁷. There is no doubt, however, that Zippel erroneously assessed the war of Metellus Delmaticus, since he ascribed to him both military campaigns, i.e. that against the Segestani, conducted together with L. Aurelius Cotta, and the war against the Delmatae in the next year. This view, which greatly influenced the subsequent scholarly opinion, has been convincingly rejected by Morgan, who demonstrated beyond doubt that Metellus only fought the Delmatae, and only in the years 119-118, while the other Metellus, who fought against the Segestani, was a subordinate of L. Aurelius Cotta, and another member of the Caecilii family³⁸. In the opinion of Morgan, the most likely Metellus for this function would have been Delmaticus' cousin L. Caecilius Metellus Diadematus (cos. 117 BC), but this cannot be proved. One of Morgan's main arguments as to why Cotta and Metellus could not have fought jointly as consuls in 119 BC against the Segestani, is the fact that the Segestani did not represent any real danger to Italy, unlike Carthage in 149 or the Cimbri and Teutones in 102 BC, when both consuls had to take charge of the emergency. Other such cases are not attested in the second half of the 2nd century BC; Metellus was subordinate to Cotta in the same manner as was Tiberius Pandusa to Sempronius Tuditanus who, according to Appian, fought against the Iapodes (*Illyr.* 10.30).

C. Cosconius

The last attested conflict in the coastal part of Illyricum before Caesar was the war of C. Cosconius against the Delmatae in 78 BC. Some time before that date the Delmatae had captured Salonae which must have been in their hands already before Metellus' sojourn there in 119 BC. Appian did not mention this campaign, although in general he mentioned all the important campaigns and this one must have been important alone on account of its duration³⁹. Eutropius mentioned that Cosconius conquered much of Dalma-

³⁶ ZIPPEL, *Herrschaft* (n. 33), 188-189.

³⁷ ŠAŠEL KOS, *Caesar* (n. 10), 283-286.

³⁸ MORGAN, *Lucius Cotta* (n. 34).

³⁹ WILKES, *Dalmatia* (n. 33), 35.

tia, along with Salonae, and returned to Rome after two years of fighting (6.4: *ad Illyricum missus est C. Cosconius pro consule. multam partem Dalmatiae subegit, Salonas cepit et composito bello Romam post biennium rediit*), while Orosius particularly stressed the siege of Salonae which would have lasted two years (5.23.23). It is clear from the notice of Eutropius that the achievements of Cosconius were significant, and it may even be supposed that unless an undocumented campaign took place in Dalmatia in the period between his war and Caesar's proconsulship, he broke the power of the Delmatae who had to pay tribute at the time of Caesar⁴⁰.

The war against the Ardiaei and Pleraei

Appian mentioned this war at the beginning of chapter 10, referring to these peoples as the '*Ardei and the Palarii, two other Illyrian peoples*' (10.29), but the identification with the Ardiaei and Pleraei has never been disputed⁴¹. Appian did not mention the Ardiaei in his account of the Illyrian wars, although Agron was, according to Cassius Dio, a representative of the Ardiaean dynasty. He only mentioned them in the 3rd chapter, describing their conflict with the Autariatae. Appian said that the Ardiaei had attacked Roman Illyria, after which the Romans sent envoys to admonish them. When the embassy did not achieve anything, the Romans decided to attack them with an army of 10,000 infantry and 600 cavalry soldiers. On hearing this, both rebellious peoples who had not yet been prepared for fighting, sent an embassy in their turn to beg for pardon. As they did not follow the orders of the Senate to make compensation to those whom they had attacked, Fulvius Flaccus fought against them. Appian added that he could not find anything more precise about the end of his campaign, concluding that it must have been limited to a mere raid.

It is not certain whether the Ardiaei were settled within the borders of Roman Illyria or outside it; it may be inferred from Appian's words that they attacked the Roman Illyria from the outside, but they had been subjected by the Romans and may have legally been within their dominion⁴². If indeed the Narenta River represented the border of the Roman Illyria, as is currently believed, the Pleraei who inhabited the left bank of the river, would have been included within it, along with at least some of the Ardiaei

⁴⁰ S. ČAČE, Pogranične zajednice i jugoistočna granica Liburnije u kasno predrimsko i u rimsko doba (Comunità confinarie e il confine sud-orientale della Liburnia nel tardo periodo preromano e nell'epoca romana), *Diadora* 11, 1989, 87, n. 75.

⁴¹ See already ZIPPEL, *Herrschaft* (n. 33), 96.

⁴² CASSOLA, *Politica* (n. 1), 60.

who had been subdued by the Romans already in the First and Third Illyrian Wars. The exact location of these peoples is uncertain, while it is clear that the Naro/Narenta River played a strategically and economically important role in the life of the Daorsi, Pleraei and Ardiaei. Naronā was probably situated in the territory controlled by the Daorsi (*Fig. 2*)⁴³. According to Strabo, the Pleraei should be located opposite the island of Black Corcyra, while the Ardiaei were settled on the coast opposite the island of Pharos (7.5.5 c. 315; cf. Ptol. 2.16.8). Strabo's data are corroborated by Cicero's information about his fugitive slave, who may have taken refuge from Naronā among the Ardiaei (*ad fam.* 5.9; 13.77.2-3). However, due to certain other data in Greek and Roman authors, concerning the Ardiaei, they should also be located in the south-Illyrian area in present-day Montenegro and in the broad hinterland of Lissus⁴⁴, although it is not clear how to interpret these data in terms of different periods and historical contexts.

According to Appian, the Romans attacked the Ardiaei and Pleraei with two legions; despite his remark concerning an uncertain end of this campaign, both peoples were actually defeated by Flaccus. In Livy's summary of his 56th book it is stated that '*the Vardaei were subdued by the consul Fulvius Flaccus*' (*Per.* 56: *Fulvius Flaccus consul Vardaeos in Illyrico subegit*); obviously the Ardiaei were the more important enemy, since the Pleraei are not mentioned by Livy. Strabo, who did not mention Fulvius Flaccus, reported about their subsequent decline (7.5.6 c. 315). The Romans deported them to the interior of Dalmatia, on account of piracy, which had always been severely punished by them. The Ardiaei, then called Vardaei, were constrained to tilling land, which was far from suitable for agriculture, and by the time of Pliny they had no more than twenty *decuriae*, despite their formerly great power (*N. h.* 3.143: ... *populatores quondam Italiae Vardaei non amplius quam XX decuriis*). Flaccus' campaign may not have been decisive for their decline, since Strabo would have probably mentioned him. The Ardiaei may have experienced some defeats in the course of ca. 75 years between his campaign and Caesar's proconsulship in Galliae and Illyricum (59 BC), possibly during the war of C. Cosconius in 78 BC.

⁴³ See the ambiguous statements in WILKES, *Dalmatia* (n. 33), 181 (Daorsi), 176 (Ardiaei); 247 (Pleraei, Ardiaei); most of the scholars decided for the Daorsi, see N. CAMBI, Naronā u odnosu prema bosansko-hercegovačkom zaleđu u ranijoj antici (Naronā in Beziehung zum bosnisch-herzegowinischen Hinterland in der früheren Antike), in: *Međunarodni simpozijum: Bosna i Hercegovina u tokovima istorijskih i kulturnih kretanja u jugoistočnoj Evropi / Symposium international: La Bosnie-Herzégovine dans les courants des événements historiques et culturels de l'Europe de Sud-est*, Sarajevo 1989, 39-56, with earlier citations, and particularly Z. MARIĆ, Daorsi i Naronā [The Daorsi and Naronā], in: *ibid.*, 57-59.

⁴⁴ PAPAZOGLU, *Ardiéens* (n. 14); cf. also PAJAŃKOWSKI, *Ardiäer* (n. 14).

The conquest of Dalmatia at the time of Caesar and Octavian

Appian's short account of the activities of Caesar in Illyricum during his proconsulship, and, afterwards, of his supporters in the Adriatic is contained in chapters 12 and 13. Appian laid a particular stress on the fact that Caesar's authority was limited to those regions of Illyria that had by then been under Roman control⁴⁵. Recently, S. Čaće has attempted to outline the boundaries of Roman Illyricum in the period of Caesar; they have been accepted by S. Bilić-Dujmušić who recently analysed battles between the Caesarian and Pompeian parties in the Adriatic before and after Pharsalus. In his opinion Illyricum extended from the Timavus River in the northeast to the Mathis River to the south of Lissus in the southwest. The hinterland would have included all of Histria and Liburnia, half of the Iapodian territory with Arupium, most of the Delmatae, the hinterland of Narona, the Mostar Basin including the Nevesinjsko and Gatačko polje and the old Montenegro around the Scodra Lake and along the lower course of the Drilon River. Most of the Pannonian peoples as defined by Strabo would have remained outside the province (the Ditiones, Daesitates, and Pirustae)⁴⁶. However, the Timavus River was an ancient boundary of Histria, no longer relevant after the founding of Aquileia, when the Carni seem to have occupied some of the formerly Venetic and Histrian territories, including Tergeste⁴⁷. Histria was in one way or another dependent on Cisalpine Gaul⁴⁸, as was also Nauportus at the time of Caesar⁴⁹.

Appian's Caesarian narrative is completed by some thoughts in his chapter 15, which are interesting, since by revealing his personal point of view they indirectly indicate that he did not compile his sources as a matter of routine, but took a certain interest in the subject and tried to find his own solutions when they had not been offered by the authors he consulted. He expressed his surprise that so much of Illyricum had not been conquered before Augustus, and in particular that the conquest had not been carried out by Caesar, who was an excellent general, and, moreover, proconsul in Illyricum. Caesar was aware of the geo-strategic importance of Illyricum, and according to Sue-

⁴⁵ ŠAŠEL KOS, *Caesar* (n. 10), 278-279.

⁴⁶ S. ČAĆE, *Cezarov Ilirik* (unpublished), cited by S. BILIĆ-DUJMUŠIĆ, *Ratne operacije u provinciji Ilirik 49.-47. pr. Kr.*, Zadar 2001 (unpubl. M.A. thesis), 23-28.

⁴⁷ Cf. also G. BANDELLI, Veneti e Carni dalle origini alla romanizzazione, in: *Iulium Carnicum: centro alpino tra Italia e Norico dalla protostoria all'età imperiale. Atti del Convegno, Arta Terme - Cividale, 29-30 settembre 1995*, eds. G. BANDELLI, F. FONTANA (Studi e Ricerche sulla Gallia Cisalpina 13), Roma 2001, 13-38.

⁴⁸ See also BANDELLI, *Politica romana* (n. 23), 175.

⁴⁹ ŠAŠEL KOS, *Caesar* (n. 10), 294 ff.

tonius he would have been willing, towards the end of 50 BC, to renounce all power until he should be elected consul, except for retaining Cisalpine Gaul with Illyricum and two legions, or even only Illyricum with one legion (Suet., *Iul.* 29.4: ... *ut dimissis octo legionibus Transalpinaque Gallia duae sibi legiones et Cisalpina provincia vel etiam una legio cum Illyrico concederetur, quoad consul fieret*; cf. App., *Bell. civ.* 2.32.126). However, both in the course of his proconsulship and afterwards he was prevented by other, for him more important, events to act accordingly. He never undertook any systematic conquest of Illyricum, on the contrary, he neglected it on account of more urgent Gallic and civil wars. During his proconsulship he only dealt with *ad hoc* matters of urgency. The catastrophic situation of the Caesarians in the Adriatic, where on the whole the Pompeian party, in particular M. Octavius, had the upper hand, not least with the aid of the Delmatae, indicated that Caesar did not do enough to impose his authority in any lasting way⁵⁰.

In chapter 12 Appian first mentioned that during Caesar's proconsulship the Delmatae, with the support of some other people, seized Promona from the Liburni. The Liburni turned to Caesar for protection. After having sent envoys to the Delmatae, but without success, he sent a strong military detachment against them, which the 'Illyrians' killed to the last man. Due to the war against Pompey, Caesar did not renew the attack. He sailed in winter from Brundisium with as much army as he had at the time and fought against Pompey in Macedonia. The remaining army was in part brought to Caesar in Macedonia by Antony across the Adriatic in harsh winter, while fifteen cohorts of infantry soldiers and 3,000 cavalry were led to him through Illyria by Gabinius. The Delmatae attacked Gabinius' army and killed all of it, except Gabinius himself and a few soldiers who escaped. Appian's report requires commentary. The capture of Promona by the Delmatae ended infamously for the Romans. It may be inferred from Appian's account of Octavian's wars that Promona had later been recaptured by Gabinius but again occupied by the Delmatae (25.72); eventually it was re-conquered by Octavian in 34 BC. Gabinius' defeat was particularly painful for the Romans because legionary standards had been seized by the Delmatae.

In his short account Appian did not mention the devastations of the coastal regions during Caesar's proconsulship by the Pirustae, who delivered hostages to Caesar when they heard of his imminent attack against them (*Bell. Gall.* 5.1.5-6). Appian also made no mention of several important battles in the Adriatic afterwards, between the Caesarian and Pompeian parties.

⁵⁰ BILIĆ-DUJMUŠIĆ, *Ratne operacije* (n. 46); this is one of his main conclusions; cf. Ph.-S.G. FREBER, *Der hellenistische Osten und das Illyricum unter Caesar* (Palingenesia 42), Stuttgart 1993, 122 ff., who seems more optimistic.

Two took place before Pharsalus; Caesar's legate in Illyricum, the brother of the future triumvir, C. Antonius, was besieged at the island of Curicta (Krk) by the Pompeian navy and forced to surrender to M. Octavius and L. Scribonius Libo with fifteen cohorts in May/June of 49 BC (cf. Livy, *Per.* 110; Cass. Dio 41.40; Flor. 2.13[4.2]30-33; Lucan., *Phars.* 4.402-581; Oros. 6.15.8-9). This episode has not been preserved in Caesar's *Civil War*; at the beginning of the 3rd book, Caesar described Octavius' unsuccessful siege of Salonae that took place later in the year, most probably in the autumn (3.9)⁵¹. It is not mentioned by Appian, but it is described somehow inaccurately by Cassius Dio, since he probably erroneously ascribed to Octavius two sieges of Salonae (42.11)⁵². According to Dio, Gabinus would have aided the inhabitants of the town during the first siege, although this is rejected by recent interpretations, since it is generally believed that at that time Gabinus had not yet come to the province⁵³. Finally, Appian does not refer to the sea battle at the island of Tauris, which took place after Pharsalus. This was Vatinius' victorious battle in the Adriatic in the first months of 47 BC, described in *Bellum Alexandrinum* (44-47). The situation of Caesar's legate in Illyricum, Q. Cornificius, was very difficult, because he was attacked both by the Pompeians and the Delmatae. He was saved by Vatinius who sailed from Brundisium with a partly improvised fleet, relieved Epidaurum, which was besieged by M. Octavius, and defeated his superior fleet at the island of Tauris, most probably off the island of Pharos (Hvar), at one of Pakleni otoci⁵⁴.

A. Gabinus

According to the account in *Bellum Alexandrinum*, A. Gabinus came to Dalmatia in winter in 47 BC, where he was forced to fight the Delmatae in very bad conditions. His provisions supply by ships was hindered by bad weather. After he had conquered some of the fortified towns of the Delmatae, he was attacked by them on the way to Salonae and defeated, losing 2,000 of his men, including 38 centurions and 4 tribunes. He reached Salonae with the rest of his troops, fell ill and died after some months (*Bell. Alex.*

⁵¹ Both episodes are analyzed in detail by BILIĆ-DUJMUŠIĆ, *Ratne operacije* (n. 46).

⁵² G. MARASCO, Aulo Gabinio e l'Iliria al tempo di Cesare, *Latomus* 56, 1997, 318 ff.

⁵³ BILIĆ-DUJMUŠIĆ, *Ratne operacije* (n. 46), 122 ff. Cf. J.J. WILKES, A Roman Colony and Its People, in: *Longae Salonae* (Niz Salona 11), ed. E. MARIN, I-II, Split 2002, 89.

⁵⁴ Vatinius' victory is analyzed in detail by BILIĆ-DUJMUŠIĆ, *Ratne operacije* (n. 46), 211 ff.; the identification of the island of Tauris either with Šipan or Šćedro may be considered as obsolete: N. ŠTUK, Insula Tauris – Šćedro ili Šipan?, in: *Strena Buliciana* (ed. M. ABRAMIĆ, V. HOFFILLER), Zagreb, Split 1924, 275-278; G. VEITH, Zu den Kämpfen der Caesarianer in Illyrien, in: *Strena Buliciana* (cit.), 267-274.

43.1-3). His defeat is referred to by Cicero as one of several Caesarian disasters in his letter to Atticus of June 3 of that year (*ad Att.* 11.16.1). Appian's account of Gabinius' mission is in part different, in part contradictory; it is narrated in chapters 12, 25 and 27 of the *Illyrike*. G. Marasco concluded, on the basis of Appian's contradictory data, that Gabinius must have twice received orders from Caesar to bring troops across the Adriatic. First before Pharsalus, which corresponds to the first part of Appian's episode concerning Gabinius in the 12th chapter. Not wishing to cross the sea in winter (as did Caesar himself and Antony), he decided to march to Macedonia through Illyricum on foot to bring reinforcements to Caesar (12.35-36); this data is confirmed by Plutarch (*Ant.* 7.2-3). It is not preserved in the sources how this mission ended but almost certainly it never took place. At that period it would have been impossible for a Roman army to cross Illyricum overland and Gabinius must have soon abandoned his march.

Gabinius was sent by Caesar to Illyricum for the second time after Pompey's defeat, to bring aid to Cornificius. It was on this occasion that he experienced the defeat, described by the *Bellum Alexandrinum* and supplemented by Appian. The numbers in chapter 12, fifteen cohorts and 3,000 cavalry, refer to the first mission, the defeat to the second. Appian's reference to Gabinius' defeat is also found in his account of Octavian's military campaigns in Dalmatia in 34-33 BC, when he was ambushed by the Delmatae near Synodium. In chapter 25 it is said that five cohorts had been killed by the Delmatae and military standards seized (25.71), while in chapter 27 the ambush near Synodium is mentioned (27.78)⁵⁵. Appian misunderstood the data in his one or various sources, ascribing everything concerning Gabinius to his second mission, not noticing the contradiction contained in the different numbers of troops; fifteen cohorts and 3,000 cavalry in chapter 12, as opposed to five cohorts in chapter 25, corresponding to the numbers in the *Bellum Alexandrinum*.

S. Bilić-Dujmušić concluded that the initial phases of Gabinius' campaign against the Delmatae must have been more successful than it would appear from the *Bellum Alexandrinum*; most probably he re-conquered the formerly Liburnian Promona and several other Delmataean strongholds. He was defeated most of all because he had to carry out the orders of Caesar, who took too little account of the extremely difficult situation in Dalmatia⁵⁶. As has been mentioned, Cassius Dio preserved data incompatible with the

⁵⁵ See the relevant commentary in M. ŠAŠEL KOS, Octavian's Campaigns (35-33 BC) in Southern Illyricum, in: *L'Illyrie méridionale et l'Épire dans l'antiquité III (Actes du III^e colloque intern. de Chantilly, 16-19 Octobre 1996)*, ed. P. CABANES, Paris 1999, 255-264.

⁵⁶ BILIĆ-DUJMUŠIĆ, *Ratne operacije* (n. 46), 181 ff.

other extant evidence that Gabinius helped defend Salonae against M. Octavius who besieged the city in the period before Pharsalus (42.11). Although some scholars reject it⁵⁷, Gabinius perhaps nonetheless reached Salonae by sea in 49 BC, to fight against Octavius and help defend the important harbour. In this case it would be excluded that he could have brought reinforcements to Caesar before the battle at Pharsalus; perhaps he was informed that his arrival would have been too late and was recalled from his mission, and instead sent by Caesar to Salonae.

P. Vatinius

As has been said, Appian did not mention Vatinius' naval victory at Tauris, and there is also no mention of Vatinius' conquest of six hillforts of the Delmatae in 45 BC, which ended with the siege and partial conquest of the seventh; the siege was interrupted on account of the winter weather (Cic., *ad fam.* 5.10 b). After the death of Gabinius, the Delmatae may have occupied some of the coastal regions, perhaps including Salonae⁵⁸, as well as the Liburnian territory across the Tit(i)us River (Krka) and the regions of the Daorsi, probably destroying their most important settlement at Ošanići at that time⁵⁹. It is significant that Vatinius had his main headquarters in Narona, not in Salonae. Appian's account of Vatinius' activities in Illyricum is contained in chapter 13. Caesar was occupied with preparations for war against the Getae and the Parthians. The Delmatae who feared that he would attack them, sent an embassy to Rome to apologize for their past deeds and offer him alliance, which Caesar did not accept, but ordered them to pay tribute and deliver hostages. He sent Vatinius there with three legions and a large number of cavalry soldiers, to carry out the orders, but after Caesar's murder the Delmatae no longer recognized Vatinius' authority and they attacked and killed five cohorts of his army along with their commander Baebius, a man of senatorial rank. Vatinius withdrew with the rest of his troops to Epidamnus, where they were placed by the Senate under the authority of Brutus.

⁵⁷ MARASCO, *Gabinio* (n. 52), 318 ff.; BILIĆ-DUJMUŠIĆ, *Ratne operacije* (n. 46), 181 ff.

⁵⁸ G. MARASCO, Appiano e il proconsolato di P. Vatino in Illiria (45-43 a.C.), *Chiron* 25, 1995, 288.

⁵⁹ Z. MARIĆ, Die hellenistische Stadt oberhalb Ošanići bei Stolac (Ostherzegowina), *Bericht der Römisch-German. Komm.* 76, 1995, 31-72, Tab. 1-24; ID., Rezultati istraživanja utvrđenog ilirskog grada kod Ošanića blizu Stoca (1890-1978) (Forschungsergebnisse in der befestigten illyrischen Stadt zu Ošanići in der Nähe von Stolac), *Hercegovina* 2 (10), 1996, 7-33; B. MARIJAN, Gradina u Ošanićima u Stocu (naseobinski okviri i problemi arheoloških istraživanja) (Siedlungsrahmen und Schwierigkeiten bei archäologischen Untersuchungen), *Hercegovina* 6-7 (14-15), 2000-2001, 7-29.

In the opinion of G. Marasco, who rejected the historicity of the Delmataean embassy to Caesar, the data concerning Vatinius' defeat are most unlikely, not least because the same number of the cohorts would have been lost both by Gabinius and by Vatinius; Appian may have mixed up both stories⁶⁰. However, the details of either story are different, which would indicate that the Delmatae indeed inflicted two defeats on the Romans. Why did Appian omit to refer to Vatinius' largely successful initial campaign against the Delmatae? It may be supposed that he knew about it, because in general he was well informed about the entire period of the civil wars, for which he is one of the best sources. Possibly he was just not aware of it at the time, when he was composing the *Illyrike*, or else he decided not to mention it on purpose, because he left out a great deal of important information, concerning the conquest of Illyricum up to Octavian's Illyrian wars. Whether or not a systematic history of Illyria had ever been his objective, he eventually did not strive to achieve it. A minute research into the *Illyrike* has shown that Appian merely offered the main points, summarizing the events. Much of what he included was quite arbitrary, depending on which sources he used and what he recollected from his readings.

Octavian

Octavian's Illyrian wars, in particular their Dalmatian part, have been thoroughly analysed in a separate study⁶¹. Despite the indisputable fact that they were used by Octavian as a means of political propaganda against Antony, his actual military achievements should nonetheless not be underrated. The second phase of his wars was directed against the rebellious Delmatae, a constant menace to Italy ever since the Third Illyrian War; they, as has been seen, did much damage to the Caesarian party during the conflict between Caesar and Pompey. In addition to several peoples who surrendered without fighting, such as the Derbani, or those who offered little resistance, Octavian's army captured Promona, Sinodium, and Setovia, and regained the military standards lost under Gabinius. For this reason the Dalmatian part of Octavian's wars was undoubtedly more significant for him than his war against the Iapodes and the Pannonian Segestani. Thus it is not surprising that Suetonius called the wars *bellum Delmaticum* (*Aug.* 20; 22); in the *Fasti Barberini* Octavian's triumph is noted *de Dalma[t]is* (*Inscr. It.* XIII 1, p. 345), although Appian and the *Fasti Venusini* correctly term the wars as Illyrian.

⁶⁰ MARASCO, *Vatino* (n. 58).

⁶¹ ŠAŠEL KOS, *Octavian's Campaigns* (n. 55).